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Decentralization and Public Officials in Indonesia

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section I will discuss about the recruitment of government employee in Indonesia, the reason of the public officials perform corruption and the impact of bad public officials.

Before I have further discussion in this chapter, I will explain the definition of corruption in this paper. I took the definition from Indonesian law number 31/1999 and 20/2001 concerning the eradication of corruption. I use these laws as my basis for defining corruption because these laws are underpinning corruption eradication in Indonesia.

These laws define seven types of corruption that are 1) action that makes the state loss, such as manipulation in procurement; 2) Bribery; 3) Embezzlement, such as manipulation in state accountancy; 4) Blackmail; 5) Skulduggery, such as building a road that does not match with specification requirement; 6) Inside trading in procurement; 7) *Gratifikasi*, PNS who get present from other parties because of his/her positions.

6.1. The recruitment of public officials

As I explained earlier about definition of decentralization and government regulation no. 38/2007 concerning functional assignment of the central and the local government. Since decentralization era, the recruitment of public officials is also handed over from the central into the local government. It means that the local governments have authority to recruit employees too.

In local level, chief of the region, such as governor, mayor and district head manage the authority to recruit public officials. In local level, recruitment of public officials often does not have standardization of recruitment procedures. It seems that the recruitment processes in local level are managed perfunctorily.

Furthermore, in test of PNS recruitment whether in local or central level, they only have same test for different job positions. For example, public official tests for health

workers, teachers and even engineer have same type of test that is general knowledge test. Such procedure makes government has difficulty to get a capable public official.

Currently most of the local governments in Indonesia have a problem concerning with the overload employees because the local governments execute massive recruitments of employees every year. The impact is the numbers of new employees is higher than employees who retired. I assume that it happens because they do not have job planning and job analysis of employee or maybe other factors. In many departments and government offices, there are unbalance work load of public officials. The number of employees is higher than the task that they have.

I argue that the massive recruitment of the public official is related with bribery and corruptions actions at local level. I will explain further about these actions in the next section. To understand about the recruitment of government employee in Indonesia, I show the below figure concerning the procedures of government employee recruitment process.

After the university get the results of test, they will send the results to the local government then the result will be announced to public. The dash lines in the figure have the meaning in that area, there are opportunities to perform corruptions. For instance, in dash lines between candidates and local government, the candidates could "contact" local government while giving bribes with the intention to pass the test and become public officials or in vice versa government officers in local governments offer to help the candidates to become public officials.

The second dash line is between the university and the local government. This relationship also has opportunities to perform corruptions. The *modus operandi* is to arrange the passing grade score of the candidates to determine who will pass the test, certainly the one who passes the test is somebody who has already paid the bribes. The last dash line is between BKN and local government. The *modus operandi* of corruption in this area is to determine of type of jobs and quota of government employees. For instance, X local government only has financial capacity to accept 40 new government employees, however they want to accept 60 new employees, then the X local government should bribe somebody in BKN or they create fake financial report to get quota of 60 new employees.

6.2. The reason of public officials perform corruption

After I described public official recruitments in Indonesia, now the question is why the public official performs corruption even though the salaries of public official are increased for more than 80 percents? In section 2, I already explained that many scholars argue that corruptions occur rapidly in the decentralization era. In this section, I will discuss the reasons of public officials to perform corruptions.

As I mentioned earlier in decentralization era, many local governments were established. Every new local government needs public officials to run their government. Since 2001 until 2011, there were 205 new local governments in Indonesia. The

establishing of new local governments will also increase the demand of new public officials.

Meanwhile many people want to be PNS particularly young people who have age between 19-35 years because currently public officials or PNS in Indonesian language has competitive salary, allowance and remuneration. But the demand is unbalance with the supply of Indonesian labour forces. Then every people is in hard competitions to get job as PNS/public officials. Unfortunately, the competitions are often unfair.

Many government officials use these competitions to perform fraud action. They accept bribe from PNS candidates. Based on my conversations with several people who bribe to become PNS, they paid around US\$ 8.300-US\$ 11.100 to become PNS. To get this money, many of them must be in debt. After they become PNS, they have huge debts that must be paid. Meanwhile they only have salary US\$ 223-US\$ 393/month. To pay the debts, they often perform corruptions. The candidates are willing to pay the bribes because public officials in Indonesia are one of prestigious jobs and promising in the futures. The government officials accept bribes because they become official wherefore bribes also.

The bribes in recruitment process of government employee are one of corruption techniques. Other techniques are discussed by Rinaldi et al (2007:31). They explains that the techniques of corruption are forging officials travel documentation; misuse of excess funds; and manipulation in procurement process. The number of bribery money in public officials requirements based on JPNN in Ramadhan (2012: 13) is around US\$ 3,3 million/year.

Since local government has the authority to carry on recruitment of PNS. It becomes a big opportunity for corrupt bureaucrats to gain bribery money from this activity. Every year many local governments used to have massive PNS recruitments until the central government implemented the moratorium policy of PNS recruitment in 2011. Perhaps they perform massive recruitment to gain bigger opportunity to have bribery money.